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FOREWORD: LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE EMOTIONS
HEIDI LI FELDMAN*

Given that law is made by and for people, the relatively little
attention lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have paid to human
psychology is surprising.'
Too often, legal writers have either
presupposed or borrowed impoverished conceptions of human
nature, erecting legal theories for people presumptively possessed of
the requisite nature, regardless of the psychology of the actual
persons who make and live under the law. Even when they do attend
to human nature, legal scholars tend to ignore the centrality of
emotions, dispositions, fantasies, and wishes to human psychology.
The articles in this Symposium are united by their authors' resistance
to unrealistic or incomplete theories of human nature. Whether they
rely on developed social science or more speculative theories of the
mind, or a combination of the two, each author portrays human
actors in complex psychological terms and discusses the implications
for law, legal theory, moral theory, or some combination of these.
After reading the collection of articles presented here, the reader will,
I hope, see how scholars, lawyers, judges, and policymakers can work
toward law that comprehends and accepts the complexity of human
psychology.
Ever since the advent of American legal realism, some legal
scholars have incorporated psychological theory into their
arguments.2 The most famous representative of this strand of legal
realism, Jerome Frank, looked somewhat na'fve when he attempted to
diagnose judicial and scholarly tendencies toward formalism by using
a (very) roughly Freudian analysis according to which American legal
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Ph.D., Philosophy,
University of Michigan, 1993; J.D., University of Michigan, 1990; A.B., Brown University, 1986.
1. Let me stress the adjective "relatively" right from the outset. Particularly in the area of
jury research, there is excellent legal scholarship incorporating the methods of psychology. See,
e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 230 (1983); Vicki L. Smith, How Jurors Make
Decisions: The Value of Trial Innovations, in JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L.
& Contemp. Probs. 205, 218-23 (1989); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social
Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 589
(1997).
2. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
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actors, yearning for a father-figure, tried instead to substitute
determinate legal analysis based on doctrinal categories.3 Frank's
effort displays a peril for lawyers turning their attention toward

psychology: the human subject is complex and psychology itself is a
dynamic discipline; lawyers and legal scholars must beware of
overgeneralizing from psychological theories and findings. Frank's
approach, however, is refreshing because he at least attends to human
nature, and how it might affect how we think about and make law.

For much of American history, neither judges nor legal scholars-two
major purveyors of legal texts-devoted explicit attention to the

question of human nature.
When "classical legal thought" dominated American law, legal

scholarship reflected the formalist, doctrinal orientation of the
judicial opinions of that period. Both judges and legal scholars
formulated taxonomic categories based on previous legal precedents
and then applied these categories, without much explanation or
interpretation, to resolve new disputes. Classical legal thinkers did

not explore the ways in which human nature influenced the
construction of the taxonomies they drew. Indeed, to the extent that
they perceived law to be like natural science, they regarded the

taxonomies as given independently of human nature. Neither the
attitudes nor values of either the lawmaker or the citizenry mattered
to legal categories, which existed in a quasi-Platonic dimension,
4
discoverable through the careful study of prior cases.
Not that classical legal thinkers operated without a background
conception of human nature. To the extent that classical legal
3. According to Frank, law was resistant to the disenchantment that had empowered
modem science "[b]ecause in law, the father is more deeply entrenched. The law is a near
substitute for that father, a belief in whose infallibility is essential to the very life of the child."
Id., reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 209 (William Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). Frank
endorsed the idea of law as a form of social engineering and thought that judges and lawyers
who freed themselves from a feeling of constraint due to precedent would achieve "the modem
mind." Id., reprintedin AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra, at 210-11.
Modem civilization demands a mind free of father-governance. To remain fathergoverned in adult years is peculiarly the modem sin.... And law, if it is to meet the
needs of modem civilization must adapt itself to the modem mind. It must cease to
embody a philosophy opposed to change.
It must become avowedly
pragmatic.... Until we become thoroughly cognizant of, and cease to be controlled by,
the image of the father hidden away in the authority of the law, we shall not reach that
first step in the civilized administration of justice, the recognition that man is not made
for the law, but that the law is made by and for men.
Id., reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra, at 211. Morton Horwitz argues that Law
and the Modern Mind should be remembered for its criticisms of formalism and its recognition
of contingency and uncertainty rather than "its bold and simplistic psychoanalytic strokes."
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 176 (1992).
4. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 11-19.
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thinkers shared a political orientation, it was libertarian, committed
to a rather minimal state that left as much scope as possible for
citizens to exercise their individual liberty in the marketplace, where
they could bargain, contract, and exchange. Libertarianism, like
other political philosophies, has at least an implicit conception of
human nature, as evidenced by its commitments to ownership and
exchange, the activities it takes to be distinctively human and
centrally important to human welfare. A world of owners, producers,
and consumers is different than a world of, say, hedonists, thrillseekers, and adventurers; or a world of saints, ascetics, and dreamers.
What matters to these different personalities varies, and so should the
law, insofar as it seeks to promote what matters to the people it
serves.
Although legal realists sought to unmask the ideological
assumptions of classical legal thought, they did not expressly question
its implicit vision of personhood.
Subsequent critical legal
scholarship- especially feminist legal scholarship and critical race
studies-has questioned the dominant conception of the person
implicit in law and mainstream legal scholarship, particularly the way
in which lawyers and legal scholars tend to take white men as
representative of all legal actors.5 But by and large, critical legal
scholarship has not focused on the political and moral psychologies
implicit in the work it criticizes, 6 nor has it developed an alternative
scheme.
Legal realism's other intellectual heir, the law and economics
movement, suffers from an impoverishment similar to classical legal
thought. Rather than start by exploring actual human psychology,
law and economics traditionally assumed a particular human nature,
that of the expected utility maximizer. Certainly, law and economics
scholars have been far more self-conscious in adopting a theory of
5. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Foreword:McCarthyism, the Internment and the Contradictions
of Power, 40 B.C. L. REV. 9 (1998) (discussing how constitutional law and analysis looks from
the Japanese-American perspective rather than the dominant white perspective, particularly in
light of the internment experience of Japanese-Americans during World War II); Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (criticizing conventional jurisprudence
for its assumption that human beings are necessarily always bodily distinct from one another,
since this does not hold for women); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (arguing for the different
experience and meaning of rights for blacks and whites, and arguing that critical legal studies'
critiques of rights assume the white perspective).
6. But see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (using Freudian theory and cognitive
psychology to argue for the pervasiveness of unconscious racism and for the need for judges to
take it into account when performing equal protection analyses).
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human nature than were classical legal writers, but still they have
assumed, not explored, what actual people are like. Some law and
economics writers have begun to take account of how real people
differ from the economic model. Even these scholars, however,
continue to view the model as regulative for law, counting differences
between actual psychology and the model's as deviationsconsequences that the law should redress.
For the authors in this Symposium, human nature is not
something to be simplified, idealized, or reshaped by the law.
Instead, the authors urge careful attention to the reality of how
human beings think and feel. None of the authors conceives of the
law as equivalent to social science or philosophy, but each draws upon
ideas and findings from one or both of these fields to develop a
textured understanding of how human beings think and act-of who
we are.
In Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, I explore the role that character plays in the substantive law of
negligence and that cognition plays in its application.7 I argue that the
reasonable person standard should be understood as a thoughtexperiment apparatus, best operated by laypeople, who can use it to
generate normative expectations based on the conduct of a person
possessed of reasonableness, prudence, and due care for the safety of
others. 8 I concentrate on the role of prudence and due care in the
construction of negligence law's delineation of its role model because
these roles define a particular evaluative perspective. Depending
upon one's character traits, one cares more or less about certain
aspects of the world, and these concerns dispose one to take some
actions and resist others. When a court instructs a jury to compare
the conduct of a reasonable, ordinarily prudent, duly careful person
to that of the defendant to decide whether the defendant acted
negligently, the jury must apply the evaluative perspective defined by
the traits of prudence and due care and imagine how a person with
this perspective on the world would act. Performing this thought
experiment requires cognitive skills, particularly the ability to predict
the conduct of a fictional character possessed of specific virtues and
lacking certain other traits. My Article draws upon theories from the
philosophy of mind to suggest how jurors might perform this task.
7. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence,Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law,
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000).
8. Id. at 1433.
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In Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, Justin D'Arms delves deeply
into the connections among emotions, evaluative thought, and our
ability and tendency to identify emotionally with others. 9 D'Arms, a
moral philosopher, utilizes the philosophical tradition of moral
psychology, an area that increasingly intersects with philosophy of
mind, philosophy of science, and epistemology, to make his point.
D'Arms investigates how empathy helps us acquire knowledge about
what issues are significant to us and why. He argues that we can learn
from contagiously "catching" other people's emotional reactionsthat emotion can be a source of knowledge about value, as opposed
to a distortion of good judgment. 10
For lawyers, judges, and
policymakers, such knowledge about value is essential. Without
understanding what human beings justifiably care about, the law
cannot protect what does and should matter to us.
Elizabeth Rapaport's Article, Retribution and Redemption in the
Operation of Executive Clemency, further illustrates this point.11
Rapaport argues that executive clemency is a justified response to the
personal redemption that prisoners sometimes undergo, particularly
when they are incarcerated for long periods of time. 12 According to
Rapaport, an executive's emotional response to a prisoner's
transformation can justify granting clemency. 3 She believes that an
executive's empathy with the prisoner may attune the executive to
values not previously recognized or fully understood, e.g., the value of
personal transformation achieved in difficult circumstances. This may
lead the executive (and the rest of us) to see authentic worth in
granting the prisoner clemency.
Of all the writers in this Symposium, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski (the
only trained social scientist of the group, holding a doctorate in
psychology and a law degree) most clearly accepts law as a tool for
social engineering. 4 But Rachlinski expresses skepticism toward
lawyers and legal scholars who too readily rely on social scientific
theory or findings to underwrite consequentialist policy recommendations." While sympathetic to the idea "that social norms influence

9. Justin D'Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1467 (2000).
10. Id. at 1483, 1498.
11. Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive
Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501 (2000).
12. Id. at 1514.
13. Id. at 1535-36.
14. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
15. Id. at 1539.
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behavior in ways that policymakers can use," Rachlinski cautions
16
against reducing social norms to vehicles of reward and punishment.
He further questions the assumption that the law can easily
manipulate existing social norms or create new ones to alter the effect
of social norms on individual calculations of expected utility."
Rachlinski urges behavioral law and economics scholars and law and
social norms scholars to turn from rational choice theory and game
theory to sociology and social psychology for robust empirical
information about how human beings develop and respond to social
norms. 18 He provides some excellent examples of how findings in
social psychology complicate the relationships between law, social
norms, and human action. 19
Donald C. Langevoort's contribution exemplifies how the study
human
psychological tendencies can influence the way lawyers
of
perform, and even define, their jobs. 20 In Taking Myths Seriously: An
Essay for Lawyers, Langevoort discusses the phenomenon of
personal myth creation and offers reflections on its implication for the
relationship between business lawyers and their clients. Langevoort
introduces the problem of "individual sense-making" created by our
need to navigate the world, our quite incomplete information about
21
it, and our limited ability to process the information available to us.
Through a variety of psychological mechanisms, Langevoort discusses
how people answer to their need to make sense of themselves, other
people, and their environments, without allowing themselves to fully
appreciate how much their sense-making depends on guesswork.
According to Langevoort, appreciating both our need for sensemaking and our overconfidence in the way that we make sense of the
world matters to lawyers because "lawyers are involved in so much
difficult inference and decision-making in their own professional lives
and the lives of their clients. '22 Langevoort concludes that lawyers
will be better advisers and communicators if they understand the role
of personal myths in their clients'- and their own -constructions of
the world.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
L. REV.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1541.
See id.
Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT
1569,1586 (2000).
Id. at 1572-77.
Id. at 1571.
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In The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, Anne C. Dailey
argues for the application of psychoanalysis to the law. 21 Whereas
Langevoort focuses on cognitive mechanisms that fulfill our
psychological need to order our environments and our role in them,
Dailey urges that lawyers should attend to the source of our needs,
feelings, and motives, many of which are unconscious, irrational, or
both. 24 In Dailey's view, psychoanalytic theory reminds lawyers, legal
scholars, and policymakers that we are not merely better or worse
information-processors, but rather bearers of emotional energy that
stems from our unconscious. 25 Interestingly, Dailey claims that law
unduly focused on cognitive psychology will undervalue deep selfreflection and personal expression, and the political and social
conditions these require. 26 If, as Freudian theory teaches, we cannot
attain genuine autonomy without comprehending our own inner
psychologies, lawmakers interested in human liberty must consider
how the legal system encourages or discourages self-reflection and
expression that can lead to a better understanding of our own
motives, desires, and values.
The articles in this Symposium belong to a nascent movement in
legal and philosophical scholarship, a movement marked by suspicion
of oversimplification of human nature and underappreciation of the
role that emotion plays in human life. The symposium contributors
further this movement by utilizing theories of mind and substantive
findings about human psychology in careful, contextual ways. They
do not lock onto a particular movement in psychology or philosophy
and assign it exclusive explanatory power or exclusive relevance to
law. Nor are these authors unthinkingly essentialist about human
nature. None presumes that human beings think, feel, or act alike in
every context. Instead, the authors rely on fine-grained information
and ideas about human subjectivity to explore the implications of that
subjectivity for law and the related fields of ethics and epistemology.
As a group, the articles in this Symposium on Law, Psychology, and
the Emotions demonstrate that legal scholars and scholars in related
fields can use psychological and philosophical theories of human
mind and human nature unprogramatically, nondogmatically, and
nonideologically. Taken together, their work demonstrates how
23.
(2000).
24.
25.
26.

Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1599
Id. at 1606-07.
Id. at 1620.
Id. at 1606.
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empirically informed conceptions of human nature can enhance our
understanding of how law is made and how it should be made, of
what law is and what it should be.

